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PANDEMIC: CHINA AND ITS OTHER 
Samuli Seppänen† 
Abstract 
This Article discusses the ongoing coronavirus 
pandemic as an instance of ideological contestation 
between the People’s Republic of China and its 
ideological Other—the “Western” liberal democracies.  
Much of this ideological contestation highlights the 
idiosyncratic aspects of opposing ideological 
narratives.  From the illiberal perspective, promoters 
of liberal narratives on governance and public health 
can be said to focus too much on procedural 
legitimacy and, consequently, appear to be ill-placed 
to acknowledge and respond to public health 
emergencies.  Conversely, from the liberal perspective, 
advocates of illiberal narratives appear to be 
responding to a never-ending emergency and, 
consequently, seem unable to take full advantage of 
procedural legitimacy and rule-based governance in 
order to prevent public health emergencies from 
occurring.  The coronavirus pandemic also exposes 
the aspirational qualities of both ideological narratives.  
On one hand, it appears aspirational to assume that the 
coronavirus response in liberal democratic countries 
can be based on the respect for individual freedom, 
human dignity, and other liberal first principles.  On 
the other hand, the image of a strong, stable 
government projected by the CCP also seems to be 
based on aspirational notions about the coherence and 
resilience of the P.R.C.’s governance project.  In the 
middle of the pandemic, it appears that the 
coronavirus follows no ideological script. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Does illiberal political thought provide a more effective 
means for managing public health emergencies, such as the ongoing 
COVID-19 (“coronavirus”) pandemic, than a self-consciously liberal 
approach to public health?  Answers to this question relate to a central 
point of contestation in contemporary political thought:  Namely, 
whether an illiberal government, which defines itself by its 
willingness to restrict and suspend individual rights, is more effective 
in tackling political emergencies and economic and developmental 
challenges than a liberal government.1 
 
1 For recent discussion on the respective merits of liberalism and different forms 
of illiberalism (mainly authoritarianism) in the coronavirus pandemic, see, for 
example, Florian Bieber, Authoritarianism in the Time of the Coronavirus, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 30, 2020), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/30/authoritarianism-coronavirus-lockdown-
pandemic-populism [https://perma.cc/WB6P-G8VL] (discussing how COVID-19, 
like other pandemics, is subject to abuse under both authoritarian and democratic 
regimes); Francis Fukuyama, The Pandemic and Political Order: It Takes a State, 
FOREIGN AFF. (July/Aug. 2020), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-06-09/pandemic-and-
political-order [https://perma.cc/4LU8-ZJSB] (arguing that the particular regime 
type may not matter when responding to crises, and explaining the effectiveness 
of a government’s coronavirus response on the basis of factors such as a 
“competent state apparatus, a government that citizens trust . . . and effective 
leaders”); Matthew M. Kavanagh, Authoritarianism, Outbreaks, and Information 
Politics, 5 LANCET PUB. HEALTH (Mar. 2020), 
https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2468-2667%2820%2930030-X 
[https://perma.cc/TET2-S2FP] (suggesting that China’s authoritarian regime may 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss1/3
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As of August 2020, it is too early to draw conclusions about 
the efficiency of liberal and illiberal responses to the coronavirus 
pandemic.  In fact, the time may never be ripe for drawing final 
conclusions about the pandemic, as ideological narratives allow their 
promoters to justify even the most inconvenient facts.   Be that as it 
may, even in the middle of the pandemic, it is still possible to examine 
the challenges against various ideological narratives on public health 
emergencies.  It seems particularly fruitful to view such challenges in 
the context of the ideological contestation—and “Othering”—
between the People’s Republic of China (“the P.R.C.”) and “Western” 
liberal democracies.2 
Much of North American and European commentary on the 
Chinese government’s coronavirus response uses what could be 
considered liberal narratives on public health.  At play in this 
commentary are two distinct approaches to the relationship between 
human rights and public health.  The first, more conventional 
approach views human rights as checks and balances for public health 
measures, suggesting that there is a trade-off between human rights 
and public health.  The government may restrict specific rights, such 
as the freedom of movement, in public health emergencies, but these 
restrictions must be necessary, proportional, and non-discriminatory.3  
 
have prevented a timely response to the coronavirus outbreak); Minxin Pei, 
China’s Coming Upheaval: Competition, the Coronavirus, and the Weakness of 
Xi Jinping, FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 3, 2020), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-03/chinas-coming-
upheaval [https://perma.cc/CH8W-R6VV]; Zhao Yanjing (赵燕菁), Jinkuai Jianli 
Zhongguo Kangyi de Hexin Xushi (尽快建立中国抗疫的核心叙事) [Establish a 
Core Narrative for China’s Fight Against the Epidemic As Soon As Possible], AI 
SIXIANG (April 10, 2020), http://www.aisixiang.com/data/120808.html  
[https://perma.cc/WU7X-TNFM] (discussing China’s rebuttal to the Western 
critiques of China’s initial handling of the coronavirus pandemic). 
2 For China and “the Orient” as the Other of Europeans, see Teemu Ruskola, 
Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 197 (2002) (discussing how the West 
differentiates itself from China); Teemu Ruskola, Where Is Asia? When Is Asia? 
Theorizing Comparative Law and International Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 879, 
882 (2011) (describing the Orient as Europe’s first Other).  Conversely, Western 
liberal democracies act as the Other in the Chinese ideological discourse.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 104–106. 
3 According to the Siracusa Principles, restrictions on rights must be, inter alia, 
provided for by the law, applied in a non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory 
manner, pursue a legitimate aim, be proportional to their aims, and constitute the 
least restrictive means available.  ECOSOC, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation 
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The second, more recently developed human rights-based approach 
to health contends that the trade-off between human rights and public 
health is unnecessary.  Instead, this approach suggests that the 
implementation of human rights obligations (e.g., freedom of 
expression and the right to information) correlates positively with the 
attainment of public health objectives. 4   The former approach 
facilitates normative assessments of public health measures, whereas 
the latter approach provides an empirical and normative argument 
about the mutually reinforcing linkages between health and human 
rights. 
The human rights-based approach is particularly important for 
understanding the ideological contestation regarding the coronavirus 
pandemic.  This approach suggests that the illiberal nature of China’s 
governance model (including the lack of rights protections in the 
P.R.C.) was a catalyst for the coronavirus pandemic.5  The outline of 
this narrative is presently as follows:  local authorities in Wuhan, 
accustomed to repressing inconvenient truths and appeasing their 
superiors, silenced early warnings about the virus, allowing it to 
spread unnoticed. 6   Once the authorities had no choice but to 
acknowledge the outbreak, their excessively coercive measures drove 
the pandemic underground, making it more difficult to identify, 
 
and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4, annex (1985) [hereinafter Siracusa Principles]. 
4 See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & ZITA LAZZARINI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH IN THE AIDS PANDEMIC 19 (1997) (stating that “[f]reedom of expression 
is critical in medicine and health care”); see also Daniel Tarantola et al., Human 
Rights, Health and Development, 13 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS 1, 4 (2008) (discussing 
public health and rights relating to information). 
5 Salvatore Babones, The ‘Chinese Virus’ Spread Along the New Silk Road, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 6, 2020), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/06/chinese-
coronavirus-spread-worldwide-on-new-silk-road/ [https://perma.cc/9AQA-
6XPD]; Kavanagh, supra note 1; Pei, supra note 1.  Chinese scholars are aware of 
this narrative and the strategic need to respond to it.  See Zhao, supra note 1. 
6 Jane Cai, Lack of Free Speech Helped Spread of Coronavirus in China, Says 
Leading Professor, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 18, 2020), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3051219/china-paying-heavy-
price-coronavirus-because-lack-free-speech [https://perma.cc/2QCS-5ANT]; 
Edward Wong, Julian E. Barnes & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Local Officials in 
China Hid Coronavirus Dangers from Beijing, U.S. Agencies Find, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/world/asia/china-
coronavirus-beijing-trump.html [https://perma.cc/8YKR-ZV84]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss1/3
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isolate, and treat infected people.7  Up to five million people left 
Wuhan, the epicenter of the outbreak, in anticipation of strict 
quarantine measures, helping the virus to spread domestically and 
internationally.8  These people and other citizens from Hubei, the 
province in which Wuhan is located, faced discrimination elsewhere 
in China, deterring them from seeking medical attention and further 
worsening the outbreak. 9   From this perspective, the coronavirus 
pandemic was a consequence of the pathologies of illiberalism.  
Illiberal political thought also views public health through its 
internal ideological prism.  In the imagination of nineteenth and 
twentieth century theorists of, and for, dictatorial governments, the 
inability of liberal governments to respond to political emergencies 
demonstrated the need for strong, law-transcending political 
leadership. 10   In a similar vein, Chinese commentary on the 
coronavirus has highlighted the unique strengths of China’s 
authoritarian government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).11  
The Chinese government’s white paper on the coronavirus response 
 
7 Josephine Ma & Zhuang Pinghui, 5 Million Left Wuhan Before Lockdown, 1,000 
New Coronavirus Cases Expected in City, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 26, 
2020), https://www.scmp.com/print/news/china/society/article/3047720/chinese-
premier-li-keqiang-head-coronavirus-crisis-team-outbreak 
[https://perma.cc/8B5U-XGB6].  The WHO’s report on China’s coronavirus also 
notes that five million people left Wuhan during the outbreak.  See Report of the 
WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Feb. 28, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/publications-detail/report-of-the-who-china-joint-mission-
on-coronavirus-disease-2019-(covid-19) [https://perma.cc/XXU7-T7MX]. 
8 Id.  
9 Phoebe Zhang, Stranded, Quarantined, Doxxed: How Coronavirus Made 
Pariahs of Those Who Left Wuhan, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 4, 2020), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3048781/stranded-quarantined-
doxxed-how-coronavirus-made-pariahs-those [https://perma.cc/9HTY-XYFP]. 
10 DONOSO CORTÉS, ESSAYS ON CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM AND SOCIALISM, 
CONSIDERED IN THEIR FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 174–175 (William M’Donald 
trans., 1879); CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 69–70 (George 
Schwab trans., 2007) (1932). 
11 See, e.g., Mo Jihong (莫纪宏), Kangyi Douzheng shi Zhidu Youshi Zuizhijie de 
Zhengming (抗疫斗争是制度优势最直接的证明) [The Fight Against the 
Epidemic is the Most Direct Proof of the Advantages of the System], AI SIXIANG 
(May 21, 2020), http://www.aisixiang.com/data/121579.html 
[https://perma.cc/5FXX-SD9U] (commending the advantages of China’s 
governance system in light of its coronavirus response). 
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explicitly frames its successes as a consequence of CCP leadership.12  
China’s state-run media has described the Chinese government’s 
response to the pandemic as a “highly organized” war-like 
mobilization of national resources.13  Conservative voices in Chinese 
media have contrasted this undertaking with “Western…values of 
liberalism,” which prevented Western countries from adopting 
efficient public health measures in order to contain the pandemic in 
time.14 
Such critique notwithstanding, it would be a mistake to argue 
that the Chinese approach to the coronavirus pandemic amounts to a 
negation of rights and legal processes.  Appeals to legality have 
played a role in the Chinese government’s effort to contain the 
pandemic.  President Xi Jinping himself has called for the “strict 
enforcement of law on prevention and control of infectious 
diseases.”15  Such statements demonstrate that CCP leadership seeks 
to take advantage of legal processes, even if the justifications for 
doing so are not the same as in the liberal narratives on governance.16  
Adding another layer of nuance to the Chinese government’s 
approach, the Chinese Supreme People’s Court’s has given much 
play to pragmatic aspects of Chinese legal thought in its coronavirus 
response.  Among other things, the Supreme People’s Court promotes 
the settlement of legal disputes so that businesses affected by the 
 
12 P.R.C. STATE COUNCIL, FIGHTING COVID-19: CHINA IN ACTION (June 2020), 
http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2020-06/07/content_76135269.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3QC5-L3NV].  For a Chinese scholar outlining this argument as 
a response to the liberal narrative on the pandemic, see Zhao, supra note 1. 
13 Fighting Coronavirus is a People's War, GLOB. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020), 
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1178655.shtml [https://perma.cc/79SN-
UUAL]. 
14 Community Grid System Helps China Fight Virus, GLOB. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020), 
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1178528.shtml [https://perma.cc/AL2X-
RJKS].  For a discussion on similar views in the Chinese blogosphere, see Jordan 
Schneider, Chinese Commentary: “COVID-19 May Ravage America, But It 
Won’t Dent American Self-Confidence”, CHINATALK (Apr. 8, 2020), 
https://chinatalk.substack.com/p/chinese-commentary-covid-19-may-ravage 
[https://perma.cc/B6UX-9RYJ]. 
15Xi Stresses Law-based Infection Prevention, Control, XINHUA (Feb. 5, 2020), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-02/05/c_138758520.htm 
[https://perma.cc/669H-82GD]. 
16 See generally, Taisu Zhang & Tom Ginsburg, China’s Turn Toward Law, 59 
VA. J. INT’L L. 307 (2019) (discussing China’s turn towards legality). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss1/3
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pandemic will not go under due to short-term liquidity problems.17  
In line with similar restrictions adopted through legislation in other 
countries, this approach places limits on the enforcement of rights of 
creditors and landlords during the pandemic.18  
Extra-legal measures also remain a governance tool for the 
Party.  The CCP leadership describes its governance methods in terms 
of direct action, which is capable of cutting through “formalism” and 
“bureaucratism.” 19   As a reflection of the Party leadership’s 
ambiguous commitment to legality in the present pandemic, some of 
the most extreme public health measures taken by some local Chinese 
governments allegedly have no basis in Chinese law.20  Finally, it is 
 
17 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yanjiushi Fuze Ren jiu Chutai Yifa Tuoshan Shenli 
she Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Minshi Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian (Yi): 
Da  Jizhe Wen (最高人民法院研究室负责人就出台依法妥善审理涉新冠肺炎
疫情民事案件若干问题的指导意见（一）: 答记者问) [Supreme People’s 
Court Research Office Issues Guidance on the New Coronavirus Epidemic—
Answering Reporters’ Questions], SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., (Apr. 20, 2020), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-226251.html [https://perma.cc/RZ5C-
9L5G] (discussing the SPC’s guidance on the coronavirus  pandemic). 
18 For legislation in other countries, see, for example, Coronavirus Aid, Relief, 
and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/748 
[https://perma.cc/Y9P9-43W9] (providing bankruptcy relief for small business 
debtors and imposing a temporary moratorium on eviction filings); Coronavirus 
Act 2020, c. 7, § 81, sch. 29 (Gr. Brit.), 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2020/7/schedule/29 
[https://perma.cc/ZL4H-4R2W] (adopting measures to protect residential tenants 
from evictions in England and Wales). 
19 See generally Wang Zihui (王子晖), Liang Ci Zhongyao Huiyi, Xi Jinping 
Zhesange Yaoqiu Yiyiguanzhi (两次重要会议，习近平这三个要求一以贯之) 
[Two Important Meetings, Xi Jinping’s Three Consistent Requirements], XINHUA 
(Feb. 4, 2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/xxjxs/2020-
02/04/c_1125530611.htm [https://perma.cc/RX63-SZDU] (reporting on General 
Secretary Xi Jinping’s  “stark warning” to the supporters of formalism and 
bureaucratism).  In Party ideology, formalism and bureaucratism are distinct from 
legality. See text accompanying infra notes 165-169. 
20 See Shen Kui (沈岿), Dayi Zhixia Shandai Mei yige Ren de Jiben Quanli (大疫
之下善待每一个人的基本权利) [Respect Each Person’s Basic Rights Under a 
Great Epidemic], WECHAT PKUPUBLICLAW (Feb. 17, 2020), 
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/FSqrvCo9SkEEfG1apkeE6A [https://perma.cc/587Y-
XBG5] (arguing that some measures taken by the Chinese local governments 
potentially infringe upon people’s constitutional rights, such as the right of 
personal dignity, the right to adequate housing, and the right to privacy); Tong 
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noteworthy that the CCP’s extra-legal discipline inspection organs 
have set out to strengthen the ideological controls of Party cadres and 
state officials whose responsibility it is to respond to the crisis.21  
Adherence to formal legality is probably not a high priority in this 
effort.22 
The ideological narratives described in this Article provide a 
convenient structure for legitimizing and criticizing government 
responses to the coronavirus pandemic.  In these narratives China and 
liberal democracies appear as points of contrast through which the 
promoters of the narratives describe themselves.  Much of this 
ideological Othering highlights the idiosyncratic aspects and endemic 
weaknesses of the opposing ideological outlook.  From the illiberal 
perspective promoters of liberal narratives on governance and public 
health can be said to focus too much on procedural legitimacy; and 
consequently, they appear to be ill-placed to acknowledge and 
respond to public health emergencies.  Conversely, from the liberal 
perspective advocates of illiberal narratives on governance and public 
health appear to be responding to a never-ending emergency situation; 
consequently, they are unable to take full advantage of procedural 
 
Zhiwei (童之伟), Zai Fazhi Guidao Shang Huajie Gonggong Weisheng Weiji (在
法治轨道上化解公共卫生危机) [Resolve the Public Health Crisis on the Tracks 
of the Rule of Law], AI SIXIANG (Mar. 2, 2020), 
http://www.aisixiang.com/data/120415.html [https://perma.cc/Z2WS-V35R] 
(noting that some extreme measures taken by the Chinese local governments lack 
a legal basis and interfere with people’s legal rights). 
21 See Zhongyang Jiwei Guojia Jianwei Dui Guanche Dang Zhongyang Bushu 
Yaoqiu, Zuo Hao Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong 
Jiandu Gongzuo Fachu Tongzhi (中央纪委国家监委对贯彻党中央部署要求、
做好新型冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情防控监督工作发出通知) [Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervision Commission 
Issues a Notice on Implementing the Requirements of the CCP Central Committee 
on the Prevention and Control of the Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia], CENT. 
COMM’N FOR DISCIPLINE INSPECTION  (Jan. 30, 2020), 
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/toutiao/202001/t20200130_210462.html 
[https://perma.cc/6543-67FP] [hereinafter CCDI] (describing the CCDI’s 
disciplinary requirements during the pandemic). 
22 See generally Jacques Delisle, The Rule of Law with Xi-Era Characteristics: 
Law for Economic Reform, Anticorruption, and Illiberal Politics, 20 ASIA POL’Y 
23 (2015) (discussing the thin conception of legality and the rule of law).  See 
also BRIAN TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 92–
93 (2004) (explaining how rule by law essentially collapses into rule by the 
government). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss1/3
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legitimacy and rule-based governance in order to prevent public 
health emergencies from occurring.  These ideological narratives may 
not be the only way, or even the principal way, for conceptualizing 
governance responses to the pandemic, but neither are they without 
any social effects.  Among other things, the narratives explain why 
an individual sacrifice in the face of a public health emergency is just.  
This may be because the individual is presumed to have consented to 
the laws on which coercive measures are based, or it may be because 
the governing political movement—in China, the CCP—is presumed 
to represent everybody’s interests, including the interests of those 
people who are subject to coercive measures.23 
Adopting an external perspective to both liberal and illiberal 
ideological narratives, this Article argues that the coronavirus 
pandemic exposes aspirational qualities of both these narratives.  On 
one hand, the similarity between the coercive methods adopted in 
liberal and illiberal political regimes makes the liberal justification 
for public health measures seem aspirational, or outright fictitious.  
While various rights claims can be relevant for decision-making 
about public health measures,24 seeking to generate a coherent policy 
response on the basis of liberal first principles, such as individual 
freedom and autonomy, seems aspirational at best.  In particular, it is 
by no means clear that the human rights-based approach provides a 
coherent policy framework for the coronavirus response.25  On the 
other hand, the image of a strong, stable government projected by the 
CCP also seems aspirational in light of the pandemic. 26   The 
precarious nature of the Party’s governance project is highlighted by 
the Party leaders’ ambivalent approach to formal rights and legal 
processes.  Formal rights and legal processes would allow 
inconvenient but important information to circulate freely, but such 
rights and processes could also open the floodgates for politically 
subversive speech, which could destabilize the regime.27 
 
23 See infra text accompanying notes 106, 288–29. 
24 Samuli Seppänen, From Substance to Absence: Argumentative Strategies in the 
Implementation of the Human Rights-Based Approaches to Development, 49 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 389, 440 (2017). 
25 See infra text accompanying notes 96–98. 
26 For this projection, see P.R.C. STATE COUNCIL, supra note 12 (referring to “the 
strong leadership of the [CCP] Central Committee”). 
27 See infra text accompanying notes 127–128, 171 (discussing the CCP’s 
conflicting ideologies towards the rule of law). 
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The remaining parts of this Article are organized as follows.  
Part II describes the conventional approach to the relationship 
between health and human rights.  Part III focuses on the human 
rights-based approach to health.  Part IV examines intellectual 
criticisms against the liberal narratives on public health.  Part V 
describes illiberal narratives on public health through China’s 
response to the coronavirus outbreak.  Part VI brings the liberal and 
illiberal narratives together and examines their aspirational qualities 
and endemic weaknesses.  Part VII concludes.  
II. LIBERAL NARRATIVES ON PUBLIC HEALTH: THE 
CONVENTIONAL APPROACH 
At the highest level of abstraction, liberal narratives justify 
public health policies through principles such as individual freedom 
and respect for human agency, autonomy, and dignity. 28   The 
provision of available and accessible healthcare services, for instance, 
must allow people to live “a life in dignity.”29  Restrictive public 
health measures, such as the isolation of infected patients and the 
quarantining of potentially infected people, must facilitate maximum 
space for individual freedom and respect personal dignity.30  Such 
measures can be said to be necessary only so far as they protect the 
freedom and human agency of others, and they are legitimate if and 
when they are based on democratically agreed laws.31 
 
28 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 53, 513 (1999) (describing the first 
principle of his theory of justice as the equal right of each person to the most 
extensive scheme of basic liberties compatible with similar schemes for others, 
and arguing that equal respect for people manifests in treating them justly); Mark 
Tushnet, The Possibility of Illiberal Constitutionalism?, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1367, 
1368–69 (2017) (defining liberal constitutionalism through the principles of “the 
equality of all citizens” and “the priority of the right over the good”); Jeremy 
Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127, 128 (1987) 
(defining liberalism as a “commit[ment] to a conception of freedom and of 
respect for the capacities and the agency of individual men and women”). 
29 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights 
[CESCR], Gen. Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard 
of Physical and Mental Health (Art. 12), ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, ¶ 1 
(Aug. 11, 2000) (stating that “[e]very human being is entitled to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of health conducive to living a life in dignity”). 
30 Shen, supra note 20. 
31 Waldron, supra note 28, at 133; SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, ¶ 34. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss1/3
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The relationship between rights and public health can be 
conceived in different ways within this general conceptual 
framework.  As mentioned in the Introduction, public health 
objectives have been conventionally thought to exist in a potential 
conflict with human rights.32  The conventional approach is enshrined, 
for instance, in the Siracusa Principles, which pit human rights 
against public health objectives. 33   According to the Siracusa 
Principles, “[p]ublic health may be invoked as a ground for limiting 
certain rights in order to allow a state to take measures dealing with 
a serious threat to . . . health . . . . ”34  Restrictions on rights must be 
provided for by the law, and they must be applied in a non-arbitrary 
and non-discriminatory manner. 35   They must also be necessary, 
pursue a legitimate aim, be proportional to their aim, and constitute 
the least restrictive means available.36  Some rights and principles, 
such as the principle of non-discrimination, the right to life and the 
freedom from torture, are non-derogable.37  The Siracusa Principles 
also call for “[a]dequate safeguards and effective remedies . . . against 
illegal or abusive imposition or application of limitations on human 
rights.” 38   A similar approach to conceptualizing the relationship 
between health and human rights is apparent in the 2005 International 
Health Regulations (IHR), which govern international processes for 
preventing the spread of communicable diseases, such as the 
coronavirus.39  In addition to including a general statement about the 
“respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
persons” in the implementation of the regulations, the IHR provides 
that states “shall treat travelers with respect for their dignity, human 
 
32 At the same time, the conventional approach does not recognize a trade-off 
between individual freedom and dignity and public health.  It allows rights 
restrictions “solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the 
rights and freedoms of others . . . in a democratic society.”  G.A. Res. 217 A (III), 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 29(2) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
33 See generally SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES, supra note 3. 
34 SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, ¶ 25. 
35 Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 9.  
36 Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.  
37 Id.  ¶¶ 9, 58. 
38 Id. ¶ 18. 
39 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], INTERNATIONAL HEALTH 
REGULATIONS (2nd ed. 2005), 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/43883/9789241580410_eng.pdf?
sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/4WJ4-RQCR]. 
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rights and fundamental freedoms and minimize any discomfort or 
distress associated with such measures . . . . ”40 
This vocabulary allows one to make normative assessments 
about public health measures adopted in the present coronavirus 
pandemic.  The cordoning off of entire cities,41 the monitoring of 
people’s movement through mandatory mobile phone applications,42 
and the isolation of infected patients in clinics with access to adequate 
healthcare services can be said to satisfy the Siracusa Principles—or 
not, depending on how one weights the scales of justice.  Some 
government measures may fall short of the test set out in Siracusa 
Principles because less restrictive and more efficient public health 
measures would have been available for the authorities. 43   For 
instance, the policy in China’s Zhejiang province to allow only one 
person from a household to leave their home every two days would 
be compared unfavorably to equally effective, but more lenient 
measures adopted elsewhere in the world. 44   Other government 
measures may fail the Siracusa Principles’ test because they do not 
yield positive health outcomes. 45   For example, the practice in 
Zhejiang province to prevent people who visited heavily affected 
 
40 Id. at art. 3, 32. 
41 Zunyou Wu & Jennifer McGoogan, Characteristics of and Important Lessons 
from the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Outbreak in China: Summary of 
a Report of 72,314 Cases from the Chinese Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 323(13) JAMA 1239–1242, (Feb. 24, 2020), 
doi:10.1001/jama.2020.2648. 
42 Minghe Hu, Beijing Rolls Out Colour-coded QR System for Coronavirus 
Tracking Despite Concerns Over Privacy, Inaccurate Ratings, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/tech/apps-
social/article/3064574/beijing-rolls-out-colour-coded-qr-system-coronavirus-
tracking [https://perma.cc/4X98-EHNQ]. 
43 Compare Viola Zhou, Coronavirus: Zhejiang Adopts Draconian Quarantine 
Measures to Fight Disease, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 6, 2020), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3049298/coronavirus-zhejiang-
adopts-draconian-quarantine-measures-fight (describing local quarantine 
measures in China), with Richard Pérez-Peña, Virus Hits Europe Harder than 
China. Is that the Price of an Open Society?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/world/europe/europe-china-
coronavirus.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/UH78-43TW] 
(explaining how Singapore and South Korea used “aggressive testing and contact-
tracing to stop the chain of transmission, without shutting down economic 
activity”). 
44 Id. 
45 See Shen, supra note 20, for such a practice in the Zhejiang Province of China. 
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areas from returning to their homes led people to shelter with relatives 
or in hotels, potentially spreading the virus further.46   
The concept of discrimination in the Siracusa Principles is 
partly tied to a determination about what counts as a successful public 
health intervention.47   The forced evictions of specific groups of 
Chinese and foreign nationals, such as Nigerian people in Guangzhou, 
from their homes served no legitimate public health purpose and 
could, therefore, be seen as discriminatory under the Siracusa 
Principles.48  Under the conventional approach, it is also possible to 
think of a situation where public health measures are considered 
discriminatory even if their effect on public health is neutral or 
positive.  This would be the case with a provision of otherwise 
appropriate and necessary health services (say, a coronavirus 
vaccination program) in a discriminatory or stigmatizing manner.49  
 
46 Id. 
47 See UNAIDS, RIGHTS IN THE TIME OF COVID-19: LESSONS FROM HIV FOR AN 
EFFECTIVE, COMMUNITY-LED RESPONSE  5 (2020), 
https://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/human-rights-and-covid-
19_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7UH-7QPJ] (stating that a key lesson from the HIV 
pandemic is that the discrimination of different groups of people must be avoided 
in the design of effective public health measures); U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF HIGH 
COMM’R, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COVID-19 CRISIS 2 
(2020), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Racism/COVID-
19_and_Racial_Discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE9H-2WMY] (emphasizing 
the need for the respect of human rights and the avoidance of discrimination); 
Delan Devakumar et al., Racism and Discrimination in COVID-19 Responses, 
395 LANCET 1194 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30792-3 [ 
http://perma.cc/292J-PD3B] (explaining how a health system can only be strong if 
there is social inclusion). 
48 See supra text accompanying note 9 and Vivian Wang & Amy Qin, As 
Coronavirus Fades in China, Nationalism and Xenophobia Flare, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/world/asia/coronavirus-
china-nationalism.html [https://perma.cc/A8HG-3DH3] (describing how African 
residents of Guangzhou reported being evicted from their homes after only a few 
tested positive for coronavirus). 
49 See UNAIDS, supra note 47, at 8 (explaining that certain phrases and 
associations should be avoided when describing how the virus is transmitted); 
Wang & Qin, supra note 48 (discussing how China’s approach to controlling the 
virus has led to patriotism, nationalism, and xenophobia); Addressing Human 
Rights as Key to the COVID-19 Response, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
[WHO] (Apr. 21, 2020), 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331811/WHO-2019-nCoV-SRH-
Rights-2020.1-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [http://perma.cc/Y2VT-V8U9] 
(contending that public health emergencies often lead to discrimination against 
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The Siracusa Principles also require that “adequate safeguards and 
effective remedies” be in place against illegal and abusive rights 
restrictions.50  Finally, public health measures that have no basis in 
law fall short of the Siracusa Principles.  For instance, Chinese 
scholars have argued that city-wide lockdowns adopted in the 
beginning of the coronavirus pandemic violated Chinese laws. 51  
Even the Chinese Supreme People’s Court chastised local authorities 
for adopting unlawful measures to suppress information about the 
outbreak.52  
 
certain groups or affected persons).  See also U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF HIGH 
COMM’R, supra note 47, at 3 (emphasizing that there is no place for any form of 
discrimination while responding to coronavirus). 
50 SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, ¶ 18.  For a discussion of the context of 
this question, see Elaine Yu et al., Wuhan Rounds Up the Infected as Death Toll 
in China Jumps, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/world/asia/coronavirus-china.html 
[https://perma.cc/MQ8X-5VJ7]. 
51 See Zhiqiong June Wang, Law in Crisis: A Critical Analysis of the Role of Law 
in China’s Fight Against COVID-19, GRIFFITH L. REV. 1, 10 (2020) (explaining 
how many post-lockdown measures taken without an emergency declaration in 
parts of China were legally problematic under Chinese law); Tong, supra note 20 
(characterizing a local government’s order that residents must stay home or face 
being detained as illegal under Chinese law); Matthew Walsh, China’s Super-
Strict City Lockdowns May Be Illegal, CAIXIN GLOB. (Feb. 18, 2020), 
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-02-18/chinas-super-strict-city-lockdowns-
may-be-illegal-101517249.html [https://perma.cc/SL4N-Q2CU] (citing experts 
who say that the ban by authorities in Xiaogan on people leaving their homes may 
have been illegal).  For a detailed analysis of P.R.C. law relating to the 
coronavirus pandemic (in German), see Philipp Renninger, Corona und 
Kommunales Krisenmanagement in China—Städtisches Notfall-(Nicht-)Recht zur 
Bekämpfung von COVID-19 und Anderen Pandemien am Beispiel Wuhans, 
DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT, 739, 745 (2020) (Ger.). 
52 Wang, Law in Crisis, supra note 51, at 12–15.  For the Supreme People’s 
Court’s reaction to the reprimand issued to the coronavirus whistle-blower, Dr. Li 
Wenliang, see Tang Xinhua (唐兴华),  Zhili Youguan Xinxing Feiyan de Yaoyan 
Wenti, Zhe Pian Wenzhang Shuo Qingchu le! (治理有关新型肺炎的谣言问题，
这篇文章说清楚了!) [This Article Clarifies the Question of the Management of 
Rumours About the New Pneumonia!], SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. WEIBO (Jan. 28, 2020), 
https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404465698775629865 
[http://perma.cc/WGX9-Z9VX] (urging local authorities to disclose necessary 
pandemic information to the public).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss1/3
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III. LIBERAL NARRATIVES ON PUBLIC HEALTH: THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH 
The conventional approach to public health and human rights 
views human rights as a counterbalance and, in the case of non-
derogable rights, as trumps to public health measures.53  In doing so, 
the approach treats public health and human rights as two separate 
fields without emphasizing the causal relations between them.  This 
view on health and human rights was rethought in the 1980s and 
1990s, primarily due to another viral outbreak, the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic.54  Rather than conceptualizing human rights and public 
health objectives in terms of a conflict and a trade-off, the new 
approach saw human rights and public health objectives in mutually 
re-enforcing terms.55 
The change of perspective was partly motivated by the 
specific nature of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  Before effective 
treatment became available in the mid-1990s, individuals had few 
incentives to be tested for HIV.56  Instead of receiving treatment, a 
person who tested positive for HIV could be evicted, expelled from 
 
53 SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, ¶¶ 58–60.  Non-derogable rights include, 
inter alia, the right to life, freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
54 See Jonathan M. Mann & Daniel Tarantola, Responding to HIV/AIDS: A 
Historical Perspective, 2(4) HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 5, 5–8 (1998) (describing how 
initial strategies implemented to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic shifted to a 
human rights-based approach). 
55 Id. at 8. 
56 See, e.g., GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 4, at 43 (describing human rights 
violations against HIV-positive people early in the pandemic); Daniel Tarantola 
& Sofia Gruskin, The Recognition and Evolution of the HIV and Human Rights 
Interface: 1981–2017, in RSCH. HANDBOOK ON GLOB. HEALTH L. 303, 309–310 
(Gian Luca Burci & Brigit Toebes eds. 2018) (mentioning that public health 
measures, including HIV prevention, in the 1990s could infringe on civil and 
political rights).  The change of perspective in public health occurred at a time 
when the role of human rights was reconceptualized in development policies more 
generally.  See generally HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, THE RIGHTS 
WAY TO DEVELOPMENT: A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT 
ASSISTANCE: POLICY AND PRACTICE (2001) (outlining new steps to apply a human 
rights-based approach to development); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS 
FREEDOM (1999) (commenting on changes in the discussion of human rights and 
development in the 1990s). 
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schools and fired from their jobs. 57   Consequently, many people 
chose to remain untested and thus unaware of their HIV-positive 
status, continuing risk behavior. 58   Under the new rights-based 
approach eliminating discrimination against HIV-positive people was 
understood “as central to the global AIDS challenge as the disease 
itself.”59  Improving the rights of HIV-positive people (through, for 
instance, legal challenges to discrimination and the extensive 
application of disability legislation) reduced the social and economic 
costs of a positive HIV-test result for an individual, which further 
encouraged testing and ultimately decreased risk behavior.60 
The new insight about the interrelatedness of health and 
human rights expanded from the field of HIV/AIDS to other fields of 
public health.  According to the new human rights-based approach to 
health, human rights provided “public health with a coherent 
framework for analyzing and responding to the societal dimension of 
health.”61  Promoters of the new approach argued, and continue to 
argue, that public health measures not only contribute to the 
attainment of social and economic rights, and most obviously to the 
right to health, but that they also improve the implementation of civil 
and political rights and the principle of non-discrimination.62  All 
human rights—social, economic, and cultural, as well as civil and 
political—contribute to the aim of promoting individual freedom and 
respect for human agency.63  At the same time, promoters of the 
rights-based approaches also presume that improving human rights 
 
57 Id.  
58 See Mann & Tarantola, supra note 54, at 6–7 (mentioning that many HIV-
positive people in vulnerable population groups could not access prevention 
services due to, in part, social discrimination). 
59 Jonathan M. Mann, Statement at an Informal Briefing on AIDS to the 42nd 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION [WHO] 1 (Oct. 20, 1987), 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/61546/WHO_SPA_INF_87.12.p
df?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [http://perma.cc/4L3W-FR27]. 
60 See George J. Annas, The Impact of Health Policies on Human Rights: AIDS 
and TB Control, in HEALTH & HUM. RTS.: A READER 37, 37–40, 43 (Jonathan 
Mann et al. eds., 1999) (detailing legal challenges to United States policy toward 
HIV-positive immigrants). 
61 S. Gruskin, J. Mann & D. Tarantola, Past, Present, and Future: AIDS and 
Human Rights, 2(4) HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 1, 2–3 (1998); Tarantola & Gruskin, 
supra note 56, at 313–314. 
62 CESCR, supra note 29, ¶ 3. 
63 SEN, supra note 56, at xi–xiii. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss1/3
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conditions contributes to the achievement of public health goals.64  
This is the case even with civil and political rights.  The human rights-
based approach to health teaches, for instance, that allowing civil 
society groups to operate freely enables them to advocate for various 
health-related rights and thus improve public health conditions.65 
As is the case with other liberal narratives, in the human 
rights-based approach “the process is critical.”66  Human rights need 
to be “integrated into every component of a project and every step of 
the process.”67  The very meaning of health and other interrelated 
concepts, such as discrimination and human dignity, needs to be 
determined in a procedurally fair, human-rights-based process. 68  
This is not only a normative argument about rights but also a 
consequentialist argument about health.  Promoters of the rights-
based approaches argue that in the long run, public health policies 
and programs formulated in a liberal democratic process are more 
responsive, legitimate and effective than policies and programs that 
are handed down by authoritarian governments.69 
Arguments about the interrelatedness of health and human 
rights have appeared in much commentary on the ongoing 
coronavirus pandemic.  As mentioned above, commentators in North 
America and Europe have suggested that the illiberal nature of 
China’s one-party state enabled and encouraged Chinese officials to 
suppress information about the outbreak in its early stages, thereby 
worsening the pandemic.70  Some outspoken liberal-minded Chinese 
 
64 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], 25 QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ON 
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 20–21, (July 2002), 
https://www.who.int/hhr/information/25%20Questions%20and%20Answers%20o
n%20Health%20and%20Human%20Rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TN2-ZFRN]. 
65 See supra note 4. 
66 See Sofia Gruskin, Dina Bogecho & Laura Ferguson, ‘Rights-based 
Approaches’ to Health Policies and Programs: Articulations, Ambiguities, and 
Assessment, 31 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 129, 139 (2010). 
67 Id. 
68 See Alicia Ely Yamin, Shades of Dignity: Exploring the Demands of Equality in 
Applying Human Rights Frameworks to Health, 11 HEALTH AND HUM. RTS. 1, 13 
(2009) (arguing that, without a fair method of implementation, human rights-
based concepts would cease to be meaningful). 
69 See generally PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND THE NEW WAR ON THE POOR (2004) (discussing international 
responses to public health crises). 
70 Kavanagh, supra note 1; Steven Lee Myers & Chris Buckley, In Coronavirus, a 
‘Battle’ That Could Humble China’s Strongman, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2020, 
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scholars, such as Professor He Weifang of Peking University Law 
School, have also made the connection between liberal freedoms and 
public health in their public statements.  He Weifang has pointed out 
that the central government in Beijing knew about the epidemic 
several weeks before they announced it and took measures against 
it.71  “Without press freedom,” He Weifang concludes, “people will 
live in distress and the government in mendacity.”72  A similar belief 
is shared by the hundreds of Chinese academics who signed a petition 
in the early stages of the pandemic, calling, among other things, for 
the freedom of expression in China.73  Xu Zhangrun, a politically 
liberal law professor, who was subsequently dismissed from his 
position at Tsinghua University, has expanded the argument to the 
systemic level.74  In Xu’s view, China’s illiberal political system, 
enabled “dangerous ‘systemic impotence’ at every level.”75  Other 
critics of the Chinese government’s response have argued that the 
absence of a functioning civil society in China hampered the 
government’s efforts in the pandemic.76 
 
updated Feb. 10, 2020); https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/26/world/asia/china-
coronavirus-xi-jinping.html [https://perma.cc/9BXG-83E6]. 
71 Jun Mai & Mimi Lau, Chinese Scholar Blames Xi Jinping, Communist Party 
for Not Controlling Coronavirus Outbreak, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 6, 
2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3049233/chinese-
scholar-blames-xi-jinping-communist-party-not [https://perma.cc/WAY9-45X7].  
72 Cai, supra note 6. 
73 Mimi Lau, Echo Xie & Guo Rui, Coronavirus: Li Wenliang’s Death Prompts 
Academics to Challenge Beijing on Freedom of Speech, S. CHINA MORNING POST 
(Feb. 12, 2020), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3050086/coronavirus-
hundreds-chinese-sign-petition-calling-freedom [https://perma.cc/Q2Q4-2X6D]. 
74 For background on Xu Zhangrun, see Geremie R. Barmé, Xu Zhangrun 
Archive, CHINA HERITAGE (Apr. 16, 2019), http://chinaheritage.net/xu-zhangrun-
許章潤 [https://perma.cc/6FUU-H4Y4].  For news about his dismissal, see Guo 
Rui, China Leadership Critic Xu Zhangrun Sacked One Day After Release, 
Friends Say, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jul. 14, 2020), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3093119/china-leadership-
critic-xu-zhangrun-sacked-one-day-after [https://perma.cc/N46T-XN89]. 
75 Xu Zhangrun , Viral Alarm: When Fury Overcomes Fear, CHINAFILE (Geremie 
R. Barmé trans., Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-
opinion/viewpoint/viral-alarm-when-fury-overcomes-fear [https://perma.cc/R97S-
GSP8]. 
76 Li Yuan, In Coronavirus Fight, China Sidelines an Ally: Its Own People, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/18/business/china-
coronavirus-charity-supplies.html [https://perma.cc/4ASR-VW4J]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss1/3
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The emphasis on civil and political rights is particularly 
prominent in the commentary on China’s coronavirus response. 77  
Outside the Chinese context, much of the rights-based commentary 
focuses on social and economic rights.78  As is the case with past 
epidemics, the coronavirus pandemic has affected vulnerable groups 
with low socioeconomic status disproportionally.79  People in lower 
socio-economic groups have been most adversely economically 
affected by both lockdowns and workplace infections.80  Measures 
against the pandemic have impaired equal access to education.81  It 
has been easier for governments to impose rights restrictions that 
most affect already disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. 82   The 
argument that inadequate protection of human rights is harming the 
public health response has also been raised in the present pandemic.  
In the United States, employees who cannot afford to take sick days 
due to poor employment protection and access to social and health 
 
77 But see U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF HIGH COMM’R, supra note 47, at 3 (discussing 
widespread racial discrimination and civil rights violations globally); UNAIDS, 
supra note 47, at 6–7 (discussing the relevance of democracy and freedom of 
speech for coronavirus measures globally). 
78 See, e.g., WHO, supra note 47, at 1–2 (describing the worsening health and 
economic conditions of individuals with unstable economic conditions as a result 
of the coronavirus pandemic).  For previous pandemics, see Svenn-Erik 
Mamelund et al., The Association Between Socioeconomic Status and Pandemic 
Influenza: Protocol for a Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, SYSTEMATIC 
REV. 2 (Jan. 4, 2019), 
https://systematicreviewsjournal.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s13643-
018-0931-2 [https://perma.cc/G4VG-C695] (associating socioeconomic risk 
factors with pandemic outcomes). 
79 Id.  
80 Geoffrey Anderson et al, Using Socioeconomics to Counter Health Disparities 
Arising from the Covid-19 Pandemic, 369 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 3–4 (June 8, 2020), 
https://www.bmj.com/content/369/bmj.m2149 [https://perma.cc/S3VS-NVD9]. 
81 See Statement on COVID-19 and Youth, United Nations Inter-agency Network 
on Youth Development, ¶ 7 (2020), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Youth/COVID-19_and_Youth.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5NEN-DREY] (pointing out that underprivileged youth often 
lack access to remote learning tools); U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF HIGH COMM’R, 
supra note 47, at 4 (discussing widespread school closures globally). 
82 See U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF HIGH COMM’R, supra note 47, at 7 (discussing the 
disparate impact of coronavirus on individuals in precarious employment 
situations). 
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services are more likely to contract and spread the disease.83  Denying 
paperless immigrants access to healthcare and other services has a 
similar effect. 84   The rights-based approach to health, therefore, 
suggests that there is ultimately no trade-off between human rights 
and the containment of the coronavirus pandemic—what is good for 
human rights is good for public health.85  
IV. QUESTIONING LIBERAL NARRATIVES 
The Chinese government has adopted some elements of the 
above-described liberal narratives on the coronavirus pandemic.  In 
 
83 See, e.g., Max Fisher & Emma Bubola, As Coronavirus Deepens Inequality, 
Inequality Worsens Its Spread, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/world/europe/coronavirus-inequality.html 
[https://perma.cc/F4QK-LX7D] (describing the economic conditions of low-
income workers and the increased likelihood of contracting Covid-19 during the 
current pandemic); Faheem Ahmed et al., Comment, Why Inequality Could 
Spread COVID-19, 5(5) E240 LANCET PUB. HEALTH (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(20)30085-2 [https://perma.cc/Y2A9-
RQWW] (explaining the effects of the coronavirus pandemic on poor population 
groups).  
84 See Portugal to Treat Migrants as Residents During Coronavirus Crisis, 
REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-
portugal/portugal-to-treat-migrants-as-residents-during-coronavirus-crisis-
idUSKBN21F0N7 [https://perma.cc/65QV-9FGW] (explaining the rationale for 
granting permanent status to foreigners with pending applications); Miriam 
Jordan, We’re Petrified’: Immigrants Afraid to Seek Medical Care for 
Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/us/coronavirus-immigrants.html 
[https://perma.cc/6D6B-MTR6] (describing undocumented immigrants’ fear of 
seeking medical attention with potential coronavirus symptoms). 
85 International organizations employ both the conventional and the more holistic 
rights-based narrative in their commentary on the pandemic.  The WHO Director 
General has stated that “[a]ll countries must strike a fine balance between 
protecting health . . . and respecting human rights.”  Tedros Adhanom 
Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing 
on COVID-19–11 March 2020, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Mar. 
11, 2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-
opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19–-11-march-2020 
[https://perma.cc/9TCP-GDDN].  WHO’s policy paper on human rights and the 
coronavirus pandemic, in contrast, stresses the holistic rights-based approach to 
health, stating that “[h]uman rights frameworks provide a crucial structure that 
can strengthen the effectiveness of global efforts to address the pandemic.”  
WHO, supra note 49, at 1. 
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addition to seeking to protect the employment rights of coronavirus 
patients, the government has denounced the local authorities’ initial 
suppression of information about the outbreak.86  Nevertheless, the 
overall message of the P.R.C. government has been that China’s one-
party state has been crucial for tackling the pandemic.87  
Before discussing the Chinese government’s perspective to 
the pandemic, it may be helpful to note that the above-described 
liberal assumptions about public health have been contested outside 
China as well.  This criticism takes many forms, but most 
fundamentally, it proposes that the liberal project to justify social 
arrangements through the liberal first principles must fail.88  In reality, 
it may be argued, liberal narratives exist to provide a layer of 
ideological gloss for political decisions that do not follow from the 
above-described first principles of liberalism.89  Depending on who 
is speaking, the quarantining of cities, regions, and countries may be 
deemed disproportionate and excessive–or these measures may be 
accepted as proportionate and the least restrictive measures available, 
considering the available resources and information.  It is not the 
philosophical premises of liberalism that determine the use and 
acceptability of these measures, but something else altogether:  the 
political culture of a given country, the competence and sensibilities 
of decision-makers, the resources available to public health 
authorities, the risk tolerance of decision-makers and citizens, and so 
forth.  The same argument can be extended to the efficacy of public 
 
86 See SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., supra note 17; SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., supra note 52.  See 
also Li Yuan, Coronavirus Crisis Exposes Cracks in China’s Facade of Unity, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/business/china-
coronavirus-communist-party.html [https://perma.cc/H7Z4-VA2Z]; Steven Lee 
Myers, Xi Goes to Wuhan, Coronavirus Epicenter, in Show of Confidence, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/10/world/asia/coronavirus-china-xi-
jinping.html [https://perma.cc/P5HJ-BJMU]; Probe Findings on Li Wenliang 
Mark Start of Reflection, Holding Accountability, GLOB. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2020), 
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1183211.shtml [https://perma.cc/8CJP-Z6U5] 
(discussing the central Chinese government’s investigation into the suppression of 
whistleblower Dr. Li Wenliang). 
87 See P.R.C. STATE COUNCIL, supra note 11, and infra text accompanying notes 
104–106.  
88 See Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767–68 
(1994) (reviewing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)).  
89 See supra text accompanying note 29. 
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health measures.  The efficiency of public health measures in the 
present pandemic has depended on governmental competence, state 
capacity and the public’s trust in the state government—not on 
whether the government is liberal or not.90  Illiberal regimes may be 
competent and capable in certain regards, and at times they may even 
enjoy the public’s trust. 91   Relatedly, both liberal and illiberal 
governments have failed their citizens in numerous ways in the 
coronavirus pandemic.92 
From a critical perspective, it also appears that there are few, 
if any, self-evident consequences from the respect for individual 
freedom and human agency, autonomy and dignity for public health 
policies and measures.  For instance, a critic may point out that 
neither the expansion nor the restriction of the freedom of expression 
inevitably leads to better public health outcomes.  In fact, liberal 
vocabulary is not incompatible with restricting the freedom of 
expression in order to achieve public health objectives.  Such 
restrictions may even justify giving effect to individual agency, 
autonomy and human dignity.  For instance, European courts have 
made health-related commercial speech “conditional upon the 
disclosure of sufficient and reliable information to consumers.” 93  
The justification for restrictions on such speech is not only the 
promotion of public health objectives (and, one may argue, the right 
to health) but also the promotion of individual autonomy, which is 
contingent on allowing individuals to make decisions on an informed 
basis.94  Respect for individual autonomy and human dignity may, 
therefore, justify restrictions on the freedom of expression in the field 
of public health.  Conversely, liberal vocabulary may also be used to 
advocate the freedom of expression at the expense of public health 
 
90 Fukuyama, supra note 1. 
91 Id.  For instance, Donald Clarke has argued that whatever trust investors may 
have in the Chinese government need not be based on formal enforceable rights.  
Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China 
Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 109–111 (2003).  
92 See infra note 163. 
93 Amandine Garde, Freedom of Commercial Expression and the Public Health 
Protection in Europe, 12 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 225, 226 (2009–
2010).   
94 Id. at 231.  See also Lars Noah, Truth or Consequences?: Commercial Free 
Speech vs. Public Health Promotion (at the FDA), 21 HEALTH MATRIX 31, 90–92 
(2011) (discussing the possibility of the U.S. government restricting truthful 
commercial speech for public health reasons). 
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objectives.  This is the case when pharmaceutical companies are 
allowed a wide scope of commercial speech, despite the adverse 
public health consequences of such speech.95  
Rather than assuming that the human rights-based framework 
provides a single coherent policy framework for the coronavirus 
response, a critic may argue that rights claims in the coronavirus 
pandemic—say, claims about the right to health and the right to 
education—are mutually incompatible.96  A critic may also point out 
that the human rights-based approach recognizes no hierarchies 
between human rights and instead contends that all rights are 
interrelated and mutually re-enforcing.97  Such a posture provides no 
guidance on how to divide scarce resources in a public health 
emergency.  The interrelatedness of all human rights has made the 
human rights-based approaches analytically fuzzy.  It has also made 
the advocacy of the human rights-based approaches a difficult task in 
the public health community and especially within the WHO.98  
 
95 See David Orentlicher, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in Health Regulation: 
The Clash Between the Public Interest in a Robust First Amendment and the 
Public Interest in Effective Protection from Harm, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 299, 305 
(2011) (discussing first amendment challenges against pharmaceutical 
promotions); Sarah A. Roache et al., Big Food and Soda Versus Public Health: 
Industry Litigation Against Local Government Regulations to Promote Healthy 
Diets, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1051, 1079–1083 (2018) (discussing first 
amendment challenges against public health warning labels). 
96 In the early stages of the pandemic, the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) outlined several ways in which the 
“temporary school closures . . . could threaten the right to education.”  According 
to UNESCO, the school closures could negatively impact learning achievement, 
decrease economic productivity, and compound inequality.  Coronavirus Update: 
290 Million Students Now Stuck at Home, U.N. NEWS (Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/03/1058791 [https://perma.cc/T5RQ-8CR5].  
See also David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the 
Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 113 (2002) (describing how human rights 
can create conflicts). 
97 U.N. POP. FUND [UNFPA] & HARVARD SCH. PUB. HEALTH, A HUMAN RIGHTS-
BASED APPROACH TO PROGRAMMING: PRACTICAL INFORMATION AND TRAINING 
MATERIALS 458 (2010). 
98 See Helena Nygren-Krug, The Right to Health: From Concept to Practice, in 
ADVANCING THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 39, 40 (Jose M. Zuniga et al. eds., 
2013) (describing the conflicted ways in which human rights may be postulated); 
Seppänen, supra note 24, at 439. 
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Finally, a strand of criticism argues that the liberal emphasis 
on legal processes is misplaced and unjustified.99  There are sound 
policy reasons for not subjecting all public health policies to judicial 
review even in a liberal democracy.  On the one hand, it can be argued 
that there is no necessary link between the liberal first principles and 
the judicial review of public health measures.  The Siracusa 
Principles, for instance, refrain from calling for the judicial review of 
government decisions, being satisfied with “[a]dequate safeguards 
and effective remedies” for controlling abuses of power.100  On the 
other hand, it can be argued that the distribution of healthcare 
resources is too important a function to be left for the court system to 
decide.  In jurisdictions where the right to health may be litigated, 
legal disputes about this right end up in courts in a more or less 
random order, and judges deciding such cases typically have 
insufficient resources to do so.101 
V.  ILLIBERAL EXCEPTIONALISM 
The above-described criticisms do not need to justify illiberal 
policies or political systems.  Instead, they may be intended to expose 
the repressiveness and arbitrariness of liberal ideology in a call for 
more authentic human emancipation than what mainstream human 
rights language caters for.  Nevertheless, these criticisms may also 
justify illiberal forms of government.  In China, in particular, the 
critique of liberal narratives takes a politically meaningful form.102  
 
99 See Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement, supra note 96, at 
110 (describing the attachment of the human rights movement to legal 
machinery). 
100 SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 18. 
101 See Siri Gloppen, Litigation as a Strategy to Hold Governments Accountable 
for Implementing the Right to Health, 10 HEALTH & HUM. RTS., no. 2, 2008, at 
21, 24 (noting the casuistic nature of litigation in health promotion).  See also 
David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
189, 199–200 (2012) (describing the accrual of benefit to higher social classes 
when social rights are enforced in court). 
102 For an overview of Chinese critical scholarship, see generally Samuli 
Seppänen, Ideological Renewal and Nostalgia in China's “Avant-garde” Legal 
Scholarship, 13 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 83 (2014) (discussing three 
different strands of contemporary Chinese “avant-garde” legal scholarship).  For a 
specific text, see JIANG SHIGONG (强世功), LIFAZHE DE FALIXUE (立法者的法理
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Indeed, the ongoing coronavirus pandemic has provided an 
opportunity for the Chinese leadership to taunt the superiority of 
Chinese-style socialism compared to liberal democracies.  “Were it 
not for the unique institutional advantages of the Chinese system,” 
the China Daily explained (somewhat prematurely) in February 2020, 
“the world might be battling a devastating pandemic.”103  
According to Xi Jinping, the Chinese government’s actions in 
the coronavirus outbreak “once again demonstrated the notable 
advantages of the leadership of the [CCP] and the system of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics.”104  In Xi’s view, the CCP was able to 
deploy resources swiftly to fight the epidemic under the centralized, 
unified leadership of the Party. 105   China’s state-run media has 
advanced similar arguments about the benefits of the Chinese 
governance model.  In liberalism the “state is a ‘necessary evil’ and 
its presence must be contained, otherwise it infringes on the rights of 
individuals,” whereas in the Chinese political tradition and in 
“eastern civilizations . . . the state, the Party and the people have 
 
学) [LEGISLATORS’ JURISPRUDENCE] 10–12 (2007) (arguing that Chinese legal 
research should not become the stage of Western ideology). 
103 China’s Unprecedented Measures Prevent Novel Coronavirus Infecting the 
World, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 20, 2020), 
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202002/20/WS5e4e7a7ca310128217279147.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/628F-F39Z].  See also China’s Propagandists are Trapped 
by Their Own Rhetoric, ECONOMIST (Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://www.economist.com/china/2020/03/05/chinas-propagandists-are-trapped-
by-their-own-rhetoric [https://perma.cc/34MY-VAV4] (arguing that the promises 
of China’s propagandists can never be realized). 
104 Xi Stresses Unremitting Efforts in COVID-19 Control, Coordination on 
Economic, Social Development, XINHUA (Feb. 24, 2020), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-02/24/c_138811372.htm 
[https://perma.cc/C8A3-5TP5]. 
105 Id.  For the same argument by a Chinese scholar specializing on Marxism in 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, see Liu Zhongxun (刘忠勋), Cong 
Yiqing Fangkong Kan Woguo Zhidu Youshi he Zhili Xiaoneng (从疫情防控看我
国制度优势和治理效能) [From the Perspective of Epidemic Prevention and 
Control: China’s Institutional Advantages and Governance Effectiveness], 
CHINESE SOC. SCI. NET (Mar. 13, 2020), http://marx.cssn.cn 
[https://perma.cc/875D-UPUG] (attributing the success in controlling the 
pandemic to China’s institutional advantages and the leadership of the CCP).  See 
also P.R.C. STATE COUNCIL, supra note 11 (stating that “[a]fter weathering the 
epidemic, the Chinese people have keenly realized that the [CCP] leadership is 
the most reliable shelter against storms.”). 
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shared interests.” 106   Chinese media has cited the so-called 
community grid management system as a specific example of China’s 
state-centric and communal approach to public health. 107   This 
system makes use of idiosyncratic Chinese governance institutions, 
such as neighborhood-level Party committees and their staff members 
as well as community-level healthcare providers, in disease 
control.108  
Yet, instead of extolling the benefits of a Marxist-Leninist 
dictatorship, Chinese Party leaders and ideologues often emphasize 
more widely appealing aspects of the Party’s governance model, such 
as the socialist rule of law principle. 109   This principle not only 
comprises the strict obedience to the law, but also values such as 
equality before the law and (supposedly “socialist”) notions of formal 
 
106 Community Grid System Helps China Fight Virus, GLOB. TIMES (Feb. 5, 
2020), https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1178528.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/DPH7-H6ZC]. 
107 The “grid management system” (网格化管理) [Wanggehua Guanli] is a 
scarcely studied aspect of Chinese governance.  See Beibei Tang, Grid 
Governance in China's Urban Middle-class Neighbourhoods, 241 CHINA Q. 43, 
43 (2020) (“[T]he grid governance scheme has become a major vehicle for 
resident mobilization . . . to reinforce the Party’s leadership . . . ”); see also 
Yongshun Cai, Grid Management and Social Control in China, ASIA DIALOGUE 
(Apr. 27, 2018), https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/04/27/grid-management-and-
social-control-in-china/ [https://perma.cc/GXR4-RLDF] (describing the grid 
management system as a signal of the “government’s tightened monitoring of 
society” in China). 
108 See Tang, supra note 107, at 49–50 (describing the role of neighborhood-level 
Party committees); Guanyu Jiaqiang Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de 
Feiyan Yiqing Shequ Fangkong Gongzuo de Tongzhi (关于加强新型冠状病毒
感染的肺炎疫情社区防控工作的通知) [Notice on Strengthening Community 
Efforts on the Prevention and Control of the Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia 
Epidemic] (Jan. 24, 2020), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/fjBfo-
6lx_HksDP8_4C8sQ [https://perma.cc/CGZ9-DXMD] (describing the 
institutional arrangements for the prevention and control of the pandemic), 
translated in CHINA L.TRANSLATE, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/ncov-
community-measures/ [https://perma.cc/8LXZ-5VYM].  See also P.R.C. STATE 
COUNCIL, supra note 11 (describing the Chinese prevention and control system, 
which involves all sectors of society).  
109 Even the above-cited Global Times article emphasizes that the grid 
management system “is not an authoritarian machine.”  See GLOB. TIMES, 
Community Grid System, supra note 106. 
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and substantive justice.110  Texts referring to this ideal allude to the 
notion of “Party leadership”, but the meaning of such leadership is 
seldom fleshed out in these texts or described as unbridled political 
domination.111  The Party is, according to its own self-perception, a 
modern, scientifically governed, rule-based organization.112  
The Chinese leadership and Xi Jinping himself have 
emphasized the rule-based nature of the Party’s governance model in 
their response to the coronavirus pandemic.  Early on in the outbreak, 
Xi published an article in Qiushi, the Party’s principal theoretical 
journal, arguing that it was of utmost importance to fight the epidemic 
in a “law-based, scientific and orderly manner.” 113   The harder 
epidemic control and prevention was, Xi explained, the more 
important it was to adhere to the “rule of law” and to strengthen 
Chinese legislation on public health.114  A similar focus on legality 
can be found in the P.R.C. State Council’s white paper on the 
government’s response to the pandemic.115  The white paper explains 
that the government strengthened legal safeguards for epidemic 
prevention and control during the pandemic.116  
One aspect of this law-based response can be found in the 
Chinese Supreme People’s Court guiding opinions and model cases 
 
110 See ZHONGGONG ZHONGYANG ZHENGFA WEIYUANHUI (中共中央政法委员会
) [CENTRAL POLITICAL & LEGAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST 
PARTY], SHEHUI ZHUYI FAZHI LINIAN DUBEN (社会主义法治理念读本) 
[Readings on the Socialist Rule of Law Principle] 98–99, 104–109 (2009). 
111 See, e.g., id. at 111 (describing Party leadership as ideological leadership, 
political leadership and organizational leadership, without elaborating on the 
relationship between the Party and the judiciary). 
112 XI JINPING, THE GOVERNANCE OF CHINA (VOL. 1), 9–10, 19–20, 54, 89 (2014). 
113 Xi Jinping (习近平), Quanmian Tigao Yifa Fangkong Yifa Zhili Nengli, 
Jianquan Guojia Gonggong Weisheng Yingji Guanli Tixi (全面提高依法防控依
法治理能力, 健全国家公共卫生应急管理体系) [Comprehensively Improving 
Law-Based Epidemic Prevention and Control and the National Public Health 
Emergency Management System], QIUSHI (求是) [SEEKING TRUTH] (Feb. 29, 
2020), http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-02/29/c_1125641632.htm 
[https://perma.cc/HBK7-MBYU] [hereinafter Xi, Comprehensive Improving].  For 
an English language description of the article, see Xi’s Article on Improving 
Epidemic Prevention and Control to be Published, XINHUA (Mar. 1, 2020), 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2020-03/01/content_75760592.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5J96-W452].  
114 Xi, Comprehensively Improving, supra note 113. 
115 P.R.C. STATE COUNCIL, supra note 11. 
116 Id. 
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on coronavirus cases. 117   In part, the Supreme People’s Court’s 
guidance supports individual rights.  In its first set of guiding opinions 
on the coronavirus response, the Supreme People’s Court stated that 
Chinese people’s courts would not support the termination of 
employment contracts of employees who were suspected or 
confirmed coronavirus patients.118  At the same time, the Supreme 
People’s Court also made use of the self-consciously pragmatic 
aspects of Chinese legal thought, which emphasize the “social 
effects”, rather than the “legal effects” of a legal decision.119  In its 
guiding opinions, the Supreme People’s Court instructed lower level 
people’s courts to mitigate adverse economic effects from the 
 
117 See SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., supra note 17; Guanyu Yifa Tuoshan Shenli She 
Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Minshi Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian (Yi) (关于
依法妥善审理涉新冠肺炎疫情民事案件若干问题的指导意见（一）) 
[Guiding Opinions Concerning the Proper Hearing of Cases Related to the Novel 
Coronavirus Epidemic (First)], SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(Apr. 20, 2020), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-226241.html 
[https://perma.cc/MYW8-5HTW] (instructing lower courts to ensure the function 
of judiciary services); Guanyu Yifa Tuoshan Shenli She Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing 
Minshi Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian (Er) (关于依法妥善审理涉新冠肺
炎疫情民事案件若干问题的指导意见（二）) [Guiding Opinions Concerning 
the Proper Hearing of Cases Related to the Novel Coronavirus Epidemic 
(Second)], SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (May 19, 2020), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-230181.html [https://perma.cc/Z9R8-
72D7] (instructing lower courts on issues related to contracts, finance, and 
bankruptcy); Guanyu Yifa Tuoshan Shenli She Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Minshi 
Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian (San) (关于依法妥善审理涉新冠肺炎疫
情民事案件若干问题的指导意见（三）) [Guiding Opinions Concerning the 
Proper Hearing of Cases Related to the Novel Coronavirus Epidemic (Third)], 
SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA  (June 8, 2020), 
https://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2020/06/id/150170.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/VZE4-JUP5] (instructing lower courts on civil procedure).  
118 Guanyu Yifa Tuoshan Shenli She Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Minshi Anjian 
Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian (Yi) (关于依法妥善审理涉新冠肺炎疫情民事案
件若干问题的指导意见（一）) [Guiding Opinions Concerning the Proper 
Hearing of Cases Related to the Novel Coronavirus Epidemic (First)], supra note 
117, ¶ 4. 
119 OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL POLITICAL AND LEGAL AFFAIRS COMMISSION OF THE 
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, SHEHUI ZHUYI FAZHI LINIAN XUEXI WENDA (社会
主义法治理念学习问答） [Questions and Answers on the Socialist Rule of Law 
Concept] 31, 191 (2012). 
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pandemic through mediation and negotiation.120  The model cases 
released to illustrate this aim describe how Chinese businesses from 
fitness clubs to building companies and slaughter houses have been 
able to default on their contractual obligations without being forced 
into liquidation. 121   The Chinese people’s courts’ role in the 
coronavirus response is not, therefore, only to enforce individual 
rights but also to prevent the enforcement of such rights from causing 
harmful social effects.122 
The Party’s response to the pandemic is not limited to legal 
processes even in their most pragmatic form.  A Marxist-Leninist 
political party, such as the CCP, does not base its legitimacy on the 
observance of legal processes or, it can be argued, any other rules, 
including its own internal regulations.123  Instead of adhering to legal 
and other rule-based processes, the supposed advantage of a 
communist party leadership compared to liberal democracies is its 
ability to embody the will of the proletariat, which is remaking the 
world under the laws of dialectical and historical materialism. 124  
CCP ideology presumes that the Party represents “advanced 
 
120 Guanyu Yifa Tuoshan Shenli She Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Minshi Anjian 
Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian (Yi) (关于依法妥善审理涉新冠肺炎疫情民事案
件若干问题的指导意见（一）) [Guiding Opinions Concerning the Proper 
Hearing of Cases Related to the Novel Coronavirus Epidemic (First)], supra note 
117, ¶ 1. 
121 Quanguo Fayuan Fuwu Baozhang Yiqing Fangkong Qijian Fugong Fuchan 
Dianxing Anli (Di San Pi) (全国法院服务保障疫情防控期间复工复产典型案例
（第三批）) [Nationwide Model Cases for Ensuring the Resumption of Work and 
Production During the Prevention and Control of the Epidemic (Third Batch)], 
SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Apr. 22, 2020),  
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-226771.html [https://perma.cc/ZQD8-
Q3EQ]. 
122 For similar legislative measures in other countries, see supra note 18. 
123 For an example of this attitude, see, for example, VLADIMIR LENIN, THE 
PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE RENEGADE KAUTSKY (1918), reprinted in 
V.I. LENIN COLLECTED WORKS 28, 105 (2nd ed. 1974), 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/oct/10.htm [https://perma.cc/9KTL-
J8WN] (describing the dictatorship of the proletariat as the suppression of 
bourgeois liberty and equality).  I have discussed the role of rules in the CCP’s 
governance project elsewhere.  See Samuli Seppänen, Interrogating Illiberalism 
Through Chinese Communist Party Regulations, 52 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 267 
(2019). 
124 See generally LENIN, supra note 123 (explaining the advantages of communist 
party leadership). 
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production forces, advanced culture and the overwhelming majority 
of the Chinese people.”125  Since the actions of Party leaders are 
presumed to reflect the advanced forces in society, it is ultimately up 
to the Party leaders to decide when to follow established legal and 
other rule-based processes and when to abstain from them.126  Formal 
legality is, therefore, a concern for Party leaders and ideologues, but 
it does not have the same role in the CCP’s governance project as it 
does in the liberal narratives on public health. 
One consequence of this governance model is skepticism 
towards formal bureaucratic processes.  Early on in the coronavirus 
outbreak, Xi Jinping warned about the dangers of “bureaucratism and 
the practice of formalities for formalities’ sake,” which slowed the 
government’s effort to contain the outbreak.127  An editorial in the 
influential People’s Daily opined that “formalism” was a “chronic 
disease and no less contagious than an epidemic.”128  Indeed, Wuhan 
 
125 See What Is “Three Represents” CPC Theory?, CHINA.ORG.CN, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/zhuanti/3represents/68735.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Y5DU-6LSB] (last visited Apr. 7, 2020) (explaining the “Three 
Represents”). 
126 Among other things, this implication is achieved through the principle of 
democratic centralism, which holds that “all Party members must . . . . firmly 
uphold the authority and centralized, unified leadership of the Central Committee 
with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core . . . . ”  Zhongguo Gongchandang 
Zhangcheng (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party of China] 
(rev’d by and adopted at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China, Oct. 24, 2017), § General Program, 
http://language.chinadaily.com.cn/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-
11/06/content_34191468.htm [https://perma.cc/ZB5D-NVLD] (introducing the 
principle of democratic centralism).  The matter is, however, paradoxical, since 
the Party also instructs its members to “set a fine example in abiding by the laws 
and regulations of the state.”  Id. at art. 3.  See also LIU, infra note 171 
(discussing the principles established in the Constitution of the Communist Party 
of China).  
127 See Wang, Two Important Meetings, supra note 19 (urging the importance of 
suppressing formalism and bureaucratism).  For English language commentary on 
Xi Jinping’s statement, see Deaths in China Rise, With No Sign of Slowdown, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2020, updated Mar. 12, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/04/world/asia/coronavirus-
china.html?emc=rss&partner=rss [https://perma.cc/8BW9-CN6D]. 
128 See Fangkong ye Gao Xingshi Zhuyi, Yao Zewen Geng Yao Wenze (防控也搞
形式主义，要责问更要问责) [Formalism in Prevention and Control Must Be 
Called to Account and Condemned], PEOPLE’S DAILY (Feb. 2, 2020), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss1/3
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authorities’ failure to take timely action against the coronavirus 
outbreak can be seen as a consequence of the ills of bureaucratism 
and formalism.  As a new disease, coronavirus was not on a list of 
designated infectious diseases, which would have triggered reporting 
obligations within the Chinese healthcare system. 129   The 
“bureaucratic and formalist” organizational culture–in effect, rigid 
and hierarchical reporting mechanisms and the incentives to avoid 
responsibility for unwelcome news—allowed local authorities in 
Wuhan to keep Beijing in the dark about the outbreak. 130   Party 
leaders, therefore, aim to ensure that “formalism” does not stand in 
way of effective disease control.  One means for doing this is the 
Party’s internal discipline supervision.  Discipline supervision is 
“extra-legal” in the sense that it is outside the purview of the Chinese 
people’s courts (which themselves are under the Party’s control).131  
In the context of the coronavirus pandemic, the Party’s Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) has decreed that Party 
cadres must “deeply understand the spirit of General Secretary Xi 
Jinping’s important instructions and important speeches.” 132   The 
 
http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0202/c1003-31567364.html 
[https://perma.cc/69Q2-EHNZ] (appealing to officials to refuse formalism).  
129 See generally Wang Xixin (王锡锌), Chuanranbing Yiqing Xinxi Gongkai de 
Zhang’ai ji Kefu (传染病疫情信息公开的障碍及克服) [The Obstacles of, and 
Solutions for, Information Disclosure in Infectious Disease Pandemics], FAXUE 
(Mar. 28, 2020), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/raqY4vNJmKz2UCHTEQgpZg 
[https://perma.cc/YSX2-AEET] (reviewing the rules for information disclosure of 
infectious disease pandemics). 
130 For Chinese legal scholarship discussing the problems with the organizational 
culture in the pandemic, see Wang Jianglian (汪江连), Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing 
Fangkong ying Shiyong “Weiji Fazhi” (新冠肺炎疫情防控应适用”危机法治”) 
[Apply “Crisis Rule of Law” to Coronavirus Epidemic Prevention and Control], 
PKU L. (Feb. 19, 2020), 
http://pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Gid=335655869&Db=art 
[https://perma.cc/3XRS-FVHU] (arguing the importance of adopting “crisis rule 
of law” to combat bureaucratism).  See also GLOB. TIMES, Probe Findings on Li 
Wenliang, supra note 86 (describing how local authorities prevented Dr. Li 
Wenliang from posting the information of the pandemic online). 
131 See generally FLORA SAPIO, SOVEREIGN POWER AND THE LAW IN CHINA 8 
(2010) (discussing shuanggui as well as other legal exceptions in China); Ling Li, 
Political-Legal Order and the Curious Double Character of China’s Courts, 6 
ASIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 19, 31, 36–37 (2019) (discussing the Party’s supremacy in 
making, interpreting, applying, and enforcing the law). 
132 CCDI, supra note 21. 
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staff in discipline inspection commissions must also “struggle 
heroically” and target “formalist bureaucratic practices.”133  
Perhaps as a consequence of the Party’s ambiguous approach 
to formalism and legality (which are two separate issues), some of the 
disease control measures deployed by the Chinese government in the 
coronavirus pandemic have allegedly violated Chinese laws, as 
mentioned in Part II above.  Professor Shen Kui of Peking University 
Law School, for instance, has pointed out that all restrictions on the 
personal rights of Chinese citizens need to be based on laws adopted 
by the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee.134  In 
the field of public health, the use of coercive measures, such as 
isolations, quarantines and lockdowns, must follow the processes set 
up in the P.R.C. Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious 
Diseases.135  Shen Kui argues that many measures adopted by local 
authorities, such as the coercive home quarantining of people in 
Zhejiang province described in Part II above, violated this process.136  
Professor Tong Zhiwei from the East China University of Political 
Science and Law has expressed similar concerns about the coercive 
isolation of people in their homes.137  Zhao Hong, a professor at the 
China University of Political Science and Law in Beijing, has argued 
that restrictions on the freedom of movement in large Chinese cities 
and the banning of public gatherings “clearly violated legal 
 
133 Id.  
134 See generally Shen, supra note 20 (urging the importance of respecting basic 
human rights in the pandemic).  
135 Id.; see generally Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chuanranbing Fangzhi Fa (
中华人民共和国传染病防治法) [P.R.C. Law on the Prevention and Control of 
Infectious Diseases] (promulgated and rev’d by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., June 28, 2004, effective Dec. 1, 2004), art. 43 [hereinafter P.R.C. 
Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases] (stipulating the 
procedural requirements for the declaration of affected areas, the adoption of 
emergency measures, and the implementation of lockdowns). 
136 See Shen, supra note 20 (arguing against measures infringing personal 
freedom).  
137 See Tong, supra note 20 (criticizing measures adopted by local governments to 
limit personal freedom). 
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stipulations.” 138   Concerns about rights infringements in the 
pandemic have also appeared in the Chinese mainstream media.139 
VI. IDEOLOGICAL UNMASKING 
Advocates of both liberal and illiberal narratives can argue 
that the coronavirus pandemic reveals endemic weaknesses in the 
opposite ideological outlook.  From the illiberal perspective, the 
pandemic has demonstrated that liberal governments are inefficient 
and hypocritical.140  The critique against the inefficiency of liberal 
regimes is a classic theme in illiberal political thought.  Nineteenth 
and twentieth century opponents of liberalism argued that liberal 
governments were unwilling to restrict civil and political rights in an 
emergency situation and, as a consequence, they were unable to fight 
against various emergencies and political insurgences, in 
particular. 141   From the illiberal perspective, specific concepts of 
 
138 Matthew Walsh et al., China’s Super-Strict City Lockdowns May Be Illegal, 
CAIXIN GLOB. (Feb 18, 2020), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-02-18/chinas-
super-strict-city-lockdowns-may-be-illegal-101517249.html 
[https://perma.cc/V8HA-74DC]. 
139 See generally Cai Fei (蔡斐), Ruci Zhan “Yi”, Qunzhong hen Shengqi (如此战
“疫”, 群众很生气) [In This Battle Against the Epidemic, People Are Upset], 
RENMINWANG (Feb. 17, 2020), 
http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0217/c223228-31591169.html 
[https://perma.cc/EK3U-F5XS] (discussing the need for strict law application in 
emergency situations). 
140 See generally MO, supra note 11; Wang Xiangsui (王湘穗), Yihou Shidai de 
Quanqiu Geju yu Zhong-Mei Guanxi (疫后时代的全球格局与中美关系) [The 
Global Landscape of the Post-Epidemic Era and Sino-US Relations], AI SIXIANG 
(May 15, 2020), http://www.aisixiang.com/data/121697.html 
[https://perma.cc/F56J-GH8A] (arguing that the U.S. and Europe have fared 
poorly in their coronavirus response and discussing the U.S. President Donald 
Trump’s effort to shift the blame for the inefficient coronavirus response to 
China); Yang Sheng, Trump Tweet Infuriates China, GLOB. TIMES (Mar. 18, 
2020), https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1182873.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/47MX-EBBU] (discussing the opinion that U.S. President 
Donald Trump is trying to “cover his administration’s terrible response” by 
blaming China).  
141 See generally JUAN DONOSO CORTÉS, SPEECH ON DICTATORSHIP (1849), 
reprinted in SELECTED WORKS OF JUAN DONOSO CORTÉS 45, 46 (Jeffrey P. 
Johnson trans., 2000) (stating that a dictatorship is a legitimate form of 
governance when law is not enough to save society); CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL 
THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 63 (George 
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liberal legal thought, such as the principle of proportionality, 
encourage inaction in the face of public health emergencies.142  In the 
coronavirus pandemic, a critic may argue, principles and processes 
that were designed for previous epidemics delayed or prevented 
liberal democracies from taking measures that were necessary to 
combat the new virus.143  For instance, the initial applications of the 
IHR to the coronavirus outbreak concluded that there was no 
scientific evidence for the efficiency of travel restrictions, and that 
such restrictions, therefore, violated the dignity, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of persons. 144   This conclusion was an 
 
Schwab trans., 2005) (describing liberalism as negotiation and “a cautious 
halfmeasure”).  
142 The principle of proportionality requires that a limitation of a right be 
appropriate and necessary.  See Garde, supra note 93, at 242 (discussing the 
principle of proportionality).  See also SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at art. 
I, § A, ¶ 10 (defining “necessity”  as proportionality). 
143 See Mo, supra note 11 (stating that many capitalist governments’ response to 
the pandemic was slow and full of loopholes and arguing that China’s 
performance in combating coronavirus illustrated the advantages of its socialist 
system). 
144 Roojin Habibi et al., Do Not Violate the International Health Regulations 
During the COVID-19 Outbreak, 395 LANCET 664 (2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30373-1 [https://perma.cc/F3EJ-F876] 
(arguing that the travel restrictions against China (i) were not supported by 
scientific evidence; (ii) did not constitute the least restrictive means; (iii) could 
not be adopted as a precaution under IHR; and (iv) consequently failed to restrict 
the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons).  For earlier 
research on travel restrictions, see Ana L.P. Mateus et al., Effectiveness of Travel 
Restrictions in the Rapid Containment of Human Influenza: A Systematic Review, 
92 BULL W.H.O. 868 (2014) (asserting that travel restrictions can delay but 
cannot prevent the dissemination of influenza).  Rights-based views were 
published in Chinese media at the beginning of the outbreak.  See Wang Xigen     
(汪习根), “Yiqing Qishi” shi dui Renquan de Wuqing Tiaozhan (“疫情歧视”是
对人权的无情挑战) [“Epidemic Discrimination” is a Relentless Challenge to 
Human Rights], PEOPLE’S DAILY (Feb. 18, 2020), 
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2020-
02/18/nw.D110000renmrb_20200218_1-11.htm [https://perma.cc/D32Y-VJD2] 
(arguing against discrimination arising out of the pandemic).  See also Richard 
Pérez-Peña, Virus Hits Europe Harder Than China. Is That the Price of an Open 
Society?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/world/europe/europe-china-
coronavirus.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/T6ZL-JABH] 
(arguing that the virus has hit Europe harder because “governments aren’t used to 
giving harsh orders, and citizens aren’t used to following them”). 
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authentic application of the IHR at the time (although not the only 
possible interpretation), 145  but from a critical perspective it also 
demonstrated the inefficiency of rights-based processes.  A promoter 
of illiberal narratives and of Chinese-style Marxism, in particular, 
may contrast liberal rights-based approaches (unfavorably) with the 
mobilization of masses in the Chinese “people’s war” against the 
pandemic.146  
Another classic theme in illiberal political thought accuses 
liberalism of hypocrisy.  Liberal principles, according to this criticism, 
provide an ideological mask for a regime that is in certain 
foundational ways as repressive as illiberal regimes. 147   In an 
emergency, the classic illiberal argument runs, liberal indecisiveness 
either proves fatal (potentially causing the liberal regime to be 
replaced by an illiberal political order) or it is discarded in favor of 
measures that are not based on liberal first principles in any 
meaningful way. 148 . A critic may point out that in the present 
 
145 The IHR requires, inter alia, that health measures be based on scientific 
principles and available scientific evidence.  If scientific evidence is insufficient, 
the health measures must be based on “available information including from 
WHO and other relevant intergovernmental organizations and international 
bodies.”  See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], International Health 
Regulations, art. 43, ¶ 2 (3rd ed. 2015).  IHR also provides that the 
“implementation of these Regulations shall be with full respect for the dignity, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons.”  See id. at art. 3, ¶ 1.  In 
retrospect it can be said that the available scientific evidence at the beginning of 
the pandemic was insufficient and that the restrictions were, therefore, allowed 
under IHR.  In the beginning of the pandemic, however, scholars were operating 
on evidence from previous epidemics.  See generally Habibi et al., supra note 
144. 
146 See Wang Hui (汪晖), Jintian, Weisheme Yao Jinian Liening? Xie zai Liening 
Danchen 150 Zhounian zhi ji (今天，为什么要纪念列宁？写在列宁诞辰 150
周年之际) [Why Should We Commemorate Lenin Today? Written on Lenin’s 
150th Anniversary], WENHUA ZONGSHEN (文化纵横) (Apr. 22, 2020), 
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/5WdKGSbmGeD5Q3D1bCEfOw (discussing China’s 
coronavirus response as an instance of China’s people-centered socialism). 
147 See KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST 
PARTY, reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 469, 487 (Robert Tucker ed., 2d 
ed., 1978).  See also SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, supra note 10, at 
79 (arguing that even an apparently nonpolitical system serves friend-and-enemy 
groupings); SCHMITT,  POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 141, at 66 (arguing that 
every government is necessarily absolute). 
148 CORTÉS, supra note 10, at 174–175.  
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pandemic, governments in liberal democracies have taken up 
measures that are similar or identical to those first adopted by the 
Chinese government.  Following China’s example, for instance, the 
Italian government placed individual provinces, and finally the entire 
country, under a police-enforced lockdown.149  The assumption that 
such measures were legitimate because their subjects agreed to them, 
or could have agreed to them, through a democratic process appears 
disingenuous to a critic.  When individuals contest coercive measures 
in a court of law or elsewhere, they demonstrate their disagreement 
with these measures, even though the same individuals agreed to, or 
could have agreed to, these measures in a democratic process. For a 
critic, the role of the liberal narratives is, therefore, to add ideological 
gloss to any action that a liberal democratic government takes (or 
does not take). 
To be sure, the measures adopted in Italy and in other liberal 
democracies were not as strict as those taken in China, and in 
particular, in Wuhan.  In contrast to Wuhan, where residents were 
locked inside their apartments and monitored and supported by 
community workers, Italians were able to go out shopping and take 
care of other urgent needs.150  While the Italian measures were more 
lenient, a critic may point out that they were also less efficient than 
the Chinese ones.151  Lenient lockdown measures in the United States 
and the United Kingdom also had worse results (in terms of casualties) 
 
149 Marzia Lazzerini & Giovanni Putoto, COVID-19 in Italy: Momentous 
Decisions and Many Uncertainties, 8 LANCET 641 (2020), 
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(20)30110-
8/fulltext [https://perma.cc/U97B-3AFB]; Andrea Remuzzi & Giuseppe Remuzzi, 
COVID-19 and Italy: What Next?, LANCET (2020), 
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30627-
9/fulltext [https://perma.cc/4M4C-RGNR]. 
150 Lazzerini & Putoto, supra note 149.  See also Coronavirus: How are 
lockdowns and other measures being enforced?, B.B.C. (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-51911340 [https://perma.cc/B9HH-SVTE] 
(reporting on the strict lockdown implemented in Wuhan, which included “guards 
at entrances to resident buildings to keep people inside”). 
151 See Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report–80, WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Apr. 9, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-
reports/20200409-sitrep-80-covid-19.pdf?sfvrsn=1b685d64_6 
[https://perma.cc/Q6WN-3PX8] (displaying reports on the coronavirus pandemic 
situation from countries around the world). 
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compared to the Chinese methods.152  From the illiberal perspective, 
the Chinese government’s coronavirus response may have appeared 
excessively repressive to liberal sensibilities, but it protected Chinese 
citizens from the disease more effectively than the measures adopted 
in liberal democratic regimes.153  A promoter of illiberal narratives 
may, consequently, conclude that liberal governments were willing 
to accept more casualties in the pandemic than the P.R.C. 
government.154 
The liberal response to such critiques may reassert the 
inherent value of the liberal first principles and the institutions that 
are justified on those bases.  As imperfect and aspirational as liberal 
democratic institutions may be, allowing government agencies or 
Communist Party cadres to impose public health measures without 
democratic and judicial oversight would be a far worse arrangement.  
Since liberal first principles are protected by legal rights, it is the 
judiciary—rather than, say, the CCP’s discipline inspection organs—
that is best placed to determine the extent of these rights.155  The 
present pandemic is no reason to give up the rights-based approach 
 
152 See Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report 60, WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Mar. 19, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-
reports/20200320-sitrep-60-covid-19.pdf?sfvrsn=d2bb4f1f_2 
[https://perma.cc/UQH6-PWAE] (displaying reports on the coronavirus pandemic 
situation from countries around the world). 
153 See WHO, supra note 7, at 16–18 (describing China’s public health measures 
against coronavirus outbreak as “ambitious, agile and aggressive,” as well as 
“bold” and “science-based”); Editorial: COVID-19: Too Little, Too Late?, 395 
LANCET 755 (2020), https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-
6736%2820%2930522-5 [https://perma.cc/2KBK-FNGX] (stating that “the 
colossal public health efforts of the Chinese Government have saved thousands of 
lives”); Editorial: Emerging Understandings of 2019-nCoV, 395 LANCET 311 
(2020), https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-
6736%2820%2930186-0 [https://perma.cc/7BG6-CFXS] (stating that “Chinese 
authorities are meeting international standards”). 
154 See Schneider, supra note 14 (predicting that America will become the world’s 
most infected country, despite its confidence in its own system).  Although not 
making this claim explicitly, the P.R.C. State Council’s white paper on the 
coronavirus pandemic emphasizes that the Chinese government prioritized 
people’s lives instead of economic interests in its response.  P.R.C. STATE 
COUNCIL, supra note 12.  
155 See Alicia Ely Yamin, Promoting Equity in Health: What Role for Courts?, 16 
HEALTH & HUM. RTS J. 1, (2014) (noting the critical role of litigation for basic 
human dignity and non-discrimination in health care). 
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to health, let alone the liberal democratic governance model, even 
though some rights may need to be momentarily restricted and even 
though public health outcomes in liberal democracies may be worse 
by some measures than those in the P.R.C.156  Such setbacks are not 
the ultimate test for the legitimacy of liberal democracies. In any 
event, the coronavirus pandemic is not an existential crisis or a war-
like event for liberal democracies, as it tellingly is for the P.R.C. 
according to the Chinese government’s own white paper on its 
coronavirus response.157  
In this context, a promoter of the liberal approaches may 
concede that the above-described claims of the human rights-based 
approach are analytically unhelpful. 158   Perhaps it is analytically 
clearer to frame human rights conceptions as checks and balances on 
public health measures, rather than to assume that human rights and 
public health measures are inherently interrelated and mutually 
enforcing.  Human rights protections may sometimes lead to worse 
public health outcomes than uninhibited government action.  
Nevertheless, the argument remains that this is an acceptable outcome 
for organizing society through the liberal first principles. 
From the liberal perspective—and indeed from any 
perspective that is critical of illiberal narratives on political power—
the coronavirus pandemic also reveals the inherent fragility of 
illiberal political systems. 159   As described above, a central 
justification for illiberal regimes is their ability to provide results-
based political leadership, which transcends liberal law-based 
governance.  Unbridled by legal and participatory processes, the 
 
156 See Babones, supra note 5 (demonstrating how those with a liberal perspective 
may find the approach from China to be unappealing despite the outcomes that 
can result from such measures being put in place). 
157 See P.R.C. STATE COUNCIL, supra note 12 (describing the pandemic as a 
“great war”) and infra text accompanying note 164. 
158 See supra text accompanying notes 61–65 (regarding the interrelatedness of 
public health measures and human rights promoted by the human rights-based 
approach) and 93–95 (regarding the critique of the interrelatedness of public 
health measures and human rights). 
159 See, e.g., Editorial: Virus Exposes China’s Achilles’ Heel, TAIPEI TIMES (Feb. 
7, 2020), 
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2020/02/07/2003730505 
[https://perma.cc/PR8T-W297]; Kavanagh, supra note 1, at 136; Pei, supra note 1 
(discussing examples of fragility in the illiberal political systems from the liberal 
perspective). 
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Chinese party-state can build hospitals in a matter of days. 160  
Nevertheless, when such direct action fails to yield positive results, 
or when it appears that the illiberal government model itself has 
adverse consequences for people’s wellbeing—as many in China 
thought was the case in the first few months of the coronavirus 
outbreak—illiberal leaders cannot fall back on arguments about 
liberal first principles to legitimize their power.  Indeed, a critic may 
point out that the repression of civil and political rights has stifled 
many parts of the Chinese society, built up dissent, and prevented 
grassroots information from reaching central authorities.161  Judging 
by the postings on Chinese social media in the early stages of the 
pandemic in January and February 2020, many Chinese citizens did 
not see the initial cover-up of the coronavirus outbreak as a glitch or 
an anomaly of China’s one-Party system, but as its predictable 
outcome. 162   The public criticism abated as the government’s 
response proved effective against the virus. 163   Yet the Chinese 
 
160 See Liu, supra note 105 (explaining how the Chinese socialist system allows 
the government to concentrate on accomplishing major tasks such as building 
hospitals in a short amount of time). 
161 See Liu et al., Antagonists exploit Dr Li's death to slander China, GLOB. TIMES 
(Feb. 8, 2020), https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1178876.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/6JLH-Y84W] (detailing the Chinese government’s efforts to 
control public discourse during the pandemic).  For stability maintenance in 
China, see XUEZHI GUO, CHINA’S SECURITY STATE: PHILOSOPHY, EVOLUTION, 
AND POLITICS 418–419 (2012).  For an assessment of China’s social and political 
conditions today, see CARL MINZNER, END OF AN ERA: HOW CHINA’S 
AUTHORITARIAN REVIVAL IS UNDERMINING ITS RISE (2018); Cf. Eric Li, Xi 
Jinping Is a ‘Good Emperor’, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 14, 2020), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/14/xi-jinping-good-emperor-coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/7U5M-CRJZ] (describing how the pandemic has increased some 
people’s trust in the Communist Party). 
162 Li Yuan, Coronavirus Weakens China’s Powerful Propaganda Machine, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/26/business/china-
coronavirus-propaganda.html [https://perma.cc/UM3C-LSMK] (discussing the 
initial public criticism in China against the Chinese government’s coronavirus 
response); Pei, supra note 1. 
163 For surveys on coronavirus-related citizen satisfaction in China, see THE 
WORLD IN CRISIS: A GLOBAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY ACROSS 23 COUNTRIES 
(SUMMARY REPORT) (TOLUNA & BLACKBOX 2020),  
https://issuu.com/blackbox4/docs/world_in_crisis_final_report?fr=sZTM1ODEy
NzA0Nzc [https://perma.cc/627C-HXWS]; Cary Wu, How Chinese Citizens View 
Their Government’s Coronavirus Response, THE CONVERSATION (Jun. 5, 2020), 
https://theconversation.com/how-chinese-citizens-view-their-governments-
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government itself has recognized that the pandemic was “a major test” 
for the Chinese party-state, and that its outcome was not a 
preordained matter. 164   In the next emergency, the government’s 
efforts may not turn out to be as effective. 
For a critic, the precariousness of illiberal regimes is 
highlighted and exacerbated by Chinese political leaders’ conflicting 
approach to formal legal processes.  As pointed out above, Chinese 
leaders simultaneously call for the strict implementation of the rule 
of law principle in the management of the coronavirus pandemic, 
while they also fight against formalism and bureaucratism.165  In the 
Party ideologues’ mind, the two objectives belong to a coherent 
governance ideology.166  The rule of law stands for the dutiful (but 
not too dutiful) observance of national laws and Party regulations, 
whereas bureaucratism and formalism are reflected by inefficient 
action and work practices.  There are problems in this system—such 
as the bureaucratic reporting practices of epidemic outbreaks—but 
they can be ironed out through legal and institutional reforms. 167  
Chinese legal scholars have, for instance, called for legal reforms, 
which would allow disclosure of necessary information, while 
suppressing undesired, socially harmful speech.168  Such reform calls 
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165 See supra text accompanying notes 127–133. 
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rest on the notion that it is possible to make the Chinese party-state 
predictably governed and transparent.  
From a critical perspective, however, it appears that such 
reform attempts clash with the basic tenets of the Party’s governance 
project.  During the present pandemic, Party leaders have made use 
of laws and regulations to rein in local Party cadres, who violate the 
commands of the central leadership. 169   Yet the same laws and 
regulations can also be used to criticize the central government’s 
commands. 170   As long as Party leaders emphasize ideological 
conformity, disclosing inconvenient facts about the reality risks 
running afoul of the officially sanctioned versions of that reality.  A 
critic may wonder whether Party leaders truly are willing to create a 
culture of formalism within the state and Party organs, which would 
allow the airing of important concerns about Chinese society.  Such 
a culture could eventually be used to hold Party leaders accountable 
for their actions.171  Indeed, it appears that no matter how Chinese 
disease control and prevention laws are formulated, China’s one-
party system will end up providing Party cadres extralegal powers to 
trump inconvenient interpretations of legal norms—and attempts to 
disclose information about, say, future public health threats. 
To be sure, the above-described arguments are not fatal for 
any ideological project.  Facing criticism, defenders of liberal and 
illiberal ideological narratives may simply restate their core articles 
of faith and hope that, in the final analysis, it is their ideological 
position that most credibly accounts for the unfolding events.  
Depending on one’s perspective, the high human and economic costs 
of the pandemic in liberal democracies can attest to the inefficiency 
and relative disregard for human life and dignity in liberal regimes—
or to the robustness of liberal democracies, which can afford to 
address public health emergencies in a less than efficient manner 
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without jeopardizing their very existence.  Conversely, the P.R.C. 
government’s ability to respond to public health emergencies is either 
compromised by the ills of illiberalism—or aided by the regime’s 
ability to suspend rights and legal processes for the greater good.  
Promoters of both narratives can also rely on counterfactual 
arguments.  The pandemic would have unfolded in a less damaging 
manner, if liberal democratic governments had adhered to the rights-
based approach more closely—or if the P.R.C. government had been 
more centralized and less formalist and bureaucratic.  The role of 
ideological narratives is to help people make such leaps of faith. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has provided a tentative sketch of liberal and 
illiberal ideological narratives on the coronavirus pandemic.  To a 
large extent, these narratives highlight the idiosyncratic aspects and, 
more critically, endemic weaknesses, of the opposing ideological 
outlook.  From the illiberal perspective, promoters of liberal 
narratives on governance and public health can be said to focus too 
much on procedural legitimacy and, consequently, they appear to be 
ill-placed to acknowledge and respond to public health emergencies.  
From the liberal perspective, advocates of illiberal narratives appear 
to be responding to a never-ending emergency situation and, 
consequently, they seem unable to take full advantage of procedural 
legitimacy and rule-based governance in order to prevent public 
health emergencies from occurring.  The unsettled nature of these 
ideological arguments and the anomalies they bring out also puts into 
question the basic assumptions of both narratives.  On the one hand, 
it seems aspirational—or outright fictious—to argue that the 
coronavirus response in liberal democracies is based on respect for 
individual freedom, human dignity and other liberal first principles.  
On the other hand, the image of a strong stable government projected 
by the CCP seems to be based on aspirational notions about the 
coherence and resilience of the Party’s governance project.  In the 
middle of the coronavirus pandemic, it appears that the coronavirus 
follows no ideological script. 
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